Analyzing network associations with performance in three study populations, I find that secondhand brokerage-moving information between people to whom one is only connected indirectly-often has little or no value. Brokerage benefits are dramatically concentrated in the immediate network around a person. Why that is so, and conditions under which it is more or less so, are examined. The research implication is that brokerage can be measured with designs in which data are limited to an immediate network. The theory implication is that the social capital of brokerage is a local phenomenon mirrored in the Austrian market metaphor's emphasis on tacit, local knowledge. Figure 1 displays the network of colleagues around an investment banker working in New York in the late 1990s. The network data come from annual peer evaluations the banker's company conducted to develop employees and monitor employee reputation with colleagues. The dots are employees, and lines connect employees where one cited the other in the annual evaluation process as a colleague with whom substantial business was done last year. The banker's direct contacts are displayed in Figure 1a . It is a simple picture, but it is the actual network around an actual banker, and it is the picture captured by the network size and density measures so often used to predict opinion, behavior, and performance: Figure 1a shows a banker connected to eight colleagues (network size), most of whom do not cite one another as colleagues (network density, as the average connection between contacts, is four observed connections over 28 possible, or .14).
displays the network of colleagues around an investment banker working in New York in the late 1990s. The network data come from annual peer evaluations the banker's company conducted to develop employees and monitor employee reputation with colleagues. The dots are employees, and lines connect employees where one cited the other in the annual evaluation process as a colleague with whom substantial business was done last year. The banker's direct contacts are displayed in Figure 1a . It is a simple picture, but it is the actual network around an actual banker, and it is the picture captured by the network size and density measures so often used to predict opinion, behavior, and performance: Figure 1a shows a banker connected to eight colleagues (network size), most of whom do not cite one another as colleagues (network density, as the average connection between contacts, is four observed connections over 28 possible, or .14).
There is reason to expect the banker to be successful. The colleague network around him is full of structural holes. A structural hole refers to missing relationships that inhibit information flow between people. A hole "is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric circuit" (Burt, 1992: 18) . The lack of relations between the banker's colleagues in Figure  1a implies that they are separated by structural holes. Numerous studies have shown that managers whose social networks bridge structural holes have a competitive advantage over peers confined to a single group of interconnected people. Information, opinion, and practice are more homogeneous within than between groups, so a manager whose network spans structure holes (call him a network broker, connector, or entrepreneur) has a vision advantage in early exposure to diverse information and a general political advantage as a hub in the information flow. The competitive advantage is manifest in more positive job evaluations, higher compensation, faster promotion, good ideas-a host of performance indicators. Recent research review, opinion, speculation, and practical advice can be found in Adler and Kwon (2002) , Baker (2000) , Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai (2004) , Burt (2005) , Cohen and Prusak (2001) , Cross and Cummings (2004) , Cross and Parker (2004) , Lin (2002) , Monge and Contractor (2003) , Oh, Chung, and Labianca (2004) , Pollock, Porac, and Wade (2004) , and Soda, Usai, and Zaheer (2004) . As in other studies, results discussed below on the study population containing the banker in Figure 1 show that bankers connected to otherwise disconnected colleagues are better paid than peers surrounded by dense networks of colleagues.
However, the banker in Figure 1 was not particularly successful. On average, the colleague evaluations he received were slightly below what others in his job rank received (-.32 Z-score) . His compensation for the year was similarly undistinguished.
He received about a million dollars in salary and bonus that year, which was below the average for peers at his rank with his background (-.49 Z-score) .
The exception should not to be blown out of proportion: First, there is a strong association on average between brokerage and compensation in the banker population (as I will show later). Second, the banker in Figure 1 is one datum, and individual variation from the average is to be expected. Some people with networks rich in structural holes will not do as well as others. The prediction is only that the people with networks rich in structural holes are at higher risk of success-at higher risk of bumping into ideas with which they can create value, seeing ways to develop their ideas, and so on.
Nevertheless, a broader view of this banker's network makes his undistinguished performance less surprising. Beyond the eight colleagues with whom the banker was directly connected were 45 employees connected to one or more of the banker's eight colleagues. The additional 45 employees are displayed as a sociogram in Figure 1b . Dots are people and lines connect people where one cited the other in the annual evaluation process as a colleague with whom substantial business was done last year. Here, as in the sociograms to be presented, two people are close together to the extent that they are connected directly and indirectly through mutual colleagues (on the basis of a "spring-embedding" heuristic multidimensional scaling algorithm; Borgatti [2002] ). The primary cluster, at the top of Figure 1b , is composed of other investment bankers. Most of the banker's direct contacts are in the cluster. These contacts are not often connected directly, but they are frequently connected indirectly through mutual ties to other bankers in the cluster. Further, the banker's one contact disconnected from everyone in Figure 1b is in another banker cluster, but newly hired to a junior rank, so no one in the banker's primary cluster cited her as a colleague (see the direct contact to the southeast of the banker). That leaves one contact to a senior person outside the banker's own cluster: The contact to the southwest of the banker in Figure 1a is in the cluster at the bottom of Figure 1b , which is a group of people who specialize in a kind of financial instrument. Three of the instrument specialists are connected to bankers. The instrument specialist connected to the banker in Figure 1a is central among the specialists, directly connected with everyone in the specialist cluster.
In contrast to the Figure 1a image of the banker as spanning many structural holes, Figure 1b shows the banker bridging one hole, between the bankers and the instrument specialists. Freeman's (1977) betweenness index puts an intuitive metric on the difference between the two sociograms. In Figure  1a , the banker is in a position to broker 82 percent of the possible connections between his colleagues (23 of 28 possible). In Figure 1b , there are more connections possible in the larger network, most of which do not involve the banker. He is in a position to broker 15 percent of the possible connections (207 of 1,378 possible). The much lower score in Figure 1b indicates a much less central position for the banker, making his undistinguished performance less surprising.
This paper is about the performance implications of the difference illustrated in Figure 1 . Specifically, this paper is about the extent to which predicting performance from the simple network in Figure 1a is strengthened by including the additional data in Figure 1b . The network in Figure 1a defines opportunities to move information between direct contacts. I discuss such activity as direct brokerage, to distinguish it from moving information between friends of friends-between people to whom one is only connected indirectly-which I discuss as secondhand brokerage. In the example, apparent opportunities for direct brokerage largely disappear with the inclusion of indirect contacts that link the banker's direct contacts. Looking past the connections involving the direct contacts, one sees that opportunities for secondhand brokerage are diminished by the dense connections among the indirect contacts themselves. Note that I am making no distinction between opportunities to broker and acts of brokerage. The assumption is that more opportunities to broker increase the probability of brokerage. This is a common assumption in network research on brokerage, but it is worth noting that opportunities to broker do not automatically trigger acts of brokerage (e.g., Burt, 2005: 240 -244) . The empirical question for this paper is whether known performance correlates of direct brokerage extend to secondhand brokerage.
Despite abundant evidence on the returns to direct brokerage, virtually nothing is known about returns to secondhand brokerage (Owen-Smith and Powell [2004] is an exception noted below). Figure  1a illustrates the extent of data obtained in the survey network research design so often used to estimate network brokerage effects on performance. The respondent cites contacts, then describes relations with and among the cited contacts. To the extent that the additional data in Figure 1b better predict performance, much of the available evidence on returns to brokerage is wrong, and wrong in an unknown way. The network of direct contacts in Figure 1a overstates competitive advantage relative to the network of indirect contacts in Figure 1b . Understatement is equally possible. There were bankers in the same study population who worked in teams of densely interconnected colleagues led by someone with diverse contacts beyond the team. For such bankers, the closed network of direct contacts understates the abundant indirect access they had to structural holes among the contacts of their team leader. Does indirect access to structural holes through the team leader improve performance despite the lack of direct access?
I begin with the implications of secondhand brokerage for social capital theory and the way scholars study social capital, describe my research design, and then present results from three study populations. I find that the complexity in Figure 1b offers little or no improvement to predicting performance from the simple network in Figure 1a . Why that is so, and the network conditions under which it is more or less so, are the subjects of this paper.
IMPLICATIONS OF SECONDHAND BROKERAGE
Secondhand brokerage is consequential because it lies at the decision point between two ways of understanding, and two ways of studying, social capital.
Implications for Research Design
Beginning with the more concrete decision point, consider the research design issue discussed in the introduction. The usual survey-network research design involves gathering data on relations with and among direct contacts to define the immediate network around the survey respondent. This procedure yields the network in Figure 1a . Measures of network structure among the direct contacts, such as network size and density, are then added to traditional stratification variables predicting achievement and rewards. In an early report on returns to brokerage, for example, Burt (1992: Chap. 4 ) drew a probability sample of managers and measured brokerage within the network among each respondent's direct contacts. The same measurement strategy was used in Podolny and Baron's (1997) analysis of returns to brokerage for managers drawn from a broader range of job grades; in Hansen, Podolny, and Pfeffer's (2001) analysis of brokerage and team performance; in Mizruchi and Sterns's (2001) analysis of brokerage, risk, and success in securing loan authorization; and in Seibert, Kraimer, and Liden's (2001) report on alumni career correlates of bridging structural holes.
Structure beyond the respondent's immediate network (illustrated in Figure 1b ) is ignored in these research efforts, as in other studies based on the same survey-network research design. If there are returns to secondhand brokerage, the above research is wrong in its assumption, the reported estimates of returns to brokerage are inconsistent, and much of what has been taken as evidence is called into question.
That is, unless either of two conditions is true: the structure of direct contacts is redundant with the broader structure of indirect contacts, or the structure beyond direct contacts is irrelevant to performance.
If the network structure of direct contacts is correlated with the broader structure of indirect contacts, then it could be argued that the broader structure will not improve predictions from the structure of direct contacts. Everett and Borgatti (2005) provided one of the few, if not the only, study of structural holes among direct contacts relative to holes in a broader network (see Reagans and Zuckerman [2006] for a related analysis). Using Freeman's betweenness measure, Everett and Borgatti reported high correlations between direct and indirect access to structural holes. The more important question for social capital research is the association with performance. Regardless of correlation between the network structure of direct contacts and the network structure of indirect contacts, what is the relative association of each network with performance? Among the bankers and analysts described below, for example, the network structure of direct contacts is strongly correlated with the structure of indirect contacts-but only the structure of direct contacts is significant for performance.
Performance irrelevance is a second justification for ignoring indirect contacts. There is precedent for ignoring indirect contacts. Early network analysis focused on direct contacts. America's pioneer in this was Moreno, who focused on the network of direct contacts as a "social atom." The social atom around an individual consists of people sought by the individual and people who seek out the individual, and beyond the social atom lies a broad "acquaintance volume" of contacts "without emotional meaning for the subject" (Moreno, 1936: 289) . The social atom is the focus of emotional life around the person, the "first tangible structure empirically discernable in the formation of a human society. It is its smallest unit" (Moreno, 1941: 25) .
Moreno had a psychiatric interest in the emotional state of an individual, so it made sense to focus on the immediate network surrounding the physical site of the emotions to be understood.
In contrast, the social capital of brokerage concerns information arbitrage. Knowing how information varies between friends of friends can be valuable. For example, building on Brass's (1984) early report of promotion correlated with information control measured by Freeman's betweenness centrality, Cross and Cummings showed positive returns to brokerage measured by betweenness, a measure they used because of "its ability to account for direct and indirect ties and to thereby potentially capture greater access to expertise " (2004: 932) . Their cited precedent was Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass (2001: 130) , who included in their network measures "all the actors in the organization rather than just the actors mentioned by the focal individual" and justified their decision with the claim that "ego network data used to assess structural holes are potentially distorted by perceptual biases."
However, such studies do not clarify the value of indirect access to structural holes so much as they assume it. Betweenness combines direct with indirect contacts, so either direct or indirect access to holes could be responsible for betweenness associations with performance. Data quality is a red herring here. Whatever the method by which network data are obtained, the question remains of whether to measure brokerage with respect to the immediate network around a manager or the broader network-and evidence on which to base the decision is absent. Providing the missing evidence is the purpose at hand.
Implications for Social Capital Theory
Choice between research designs is a choice between assumptions about information flow. Information arbitrage is essential to the idea that network brokerage provides social capital. There is no competitive advantage to brokering interpersonal connections if full information is readily available. If information flow is difficult beyond direct contacts, or more valuable when facilitated between direct contacts, then it makes sense to limit brokerage models to direct contacts, as in Figure 1a . If, on the other hand, information flows easily between friends of friends, or distant bits of information can be locally valuable, then it makes sense to model brokerage into the network beyond direct contacts, as in Figure 1b .
Viewed in terms of information flow assumptions in network models, secondhand brokerage takes on theoretical significance redirecting future research because it lies at a decision point between two long-debated market metaphors on information flow: the Austrian versus the neoclassical. The neo-classical metaphor is currently dominant, and it is taken-for-granted in claims that chains of indirect connection are valuable for brokerage. However, network models of brokerage have much in common with the Austrian market metaphor, most notably as found in the work of Schumpeter and of Hayek (see Birner, 1996 Birner, , 1999 Burt, 2005: Chap. 5) .
With respect to network brokerage, the two market metaphors can be contrasted on three points. First, a small world of variably segregated groups where knowledge is more homogeneous within than between groups is an assumption in both. A second assumption in both metaphors is that there is a premium available for the integrative work of moving knowledge between groups. Third, the benefits received for successfully moving knowledge make visible the price for integrative work. To my understanding, the third point is the juncture at which the Austrian metaphor is most distinct from the neoclassical. The neoclassical metaphor posits a central mechanism, an invisible hand, by which price is determined: "The methods of neoclassical economics mainly are concerned with the establishment of economic equilibrium under fully known or (in Marshallian terminology) given conditions of resource availability, technology and preferences" (Rosen, 1997: 140) . In contrast, the Austrian metaphor holds that commercial activities "evolve as the amalgamation and interactions of trials and errors among economic agents. Entrepreneurial ventures and experiments, arbitrage activities, and survival of the fittest play crucial roles in this process. . . .This approach begins with the premise that there is an enormous amount of ignorance in the system. No one knows or can ever know what is being maximized overall. Decentralization is fundamental because specialization is extreme" (Rosen, 1997: 140 -141; cf. Ferrier & Smith, 1999: 373-374) . Where the neoclassical metaphor focuses on the balance of market factors at equilibrium, the Austrian focuses on the process by which markets move toward equilibrium. Taking information diffusion as the central market problem, Hayek referred to the market as "a system of telecommunications" (1945: 527) . If a market were to clear as if it contained a central pricing mechanism, it would be because there were sufficient intermediaries to carry local prices across otherwise segregated locations (Hayek, 1945: 524 -526; cf. Baker, 1984) .
Returns to secondhand brokerage are an empirical fulcrum for deciding between the two market metaphors as foundation for social capital theory.
Within the neoclassical metaphor, social capital is a systemwide phenomenon in which a broker finds advantage in the flow of information among people who are known to the broker as well as among people beyond the broker's immediate circle of contacts. In a mature capital market, for example, returns to secondhand brokerage are to be expected. Information on the cost of yen can be an advantage in decisions about dollar investments. The more concrete information is in a neoclassical market, the more easily it can move across the market. So, value lies not in knowing specific groups in detail so much as in knowing how groups differ-which means higher returns to secondhand brokerage because of the diversity of groups it can reach. In short, the more performance-relevant the network structure of indirect contacts, the more theory-relevant the neoclassical metaphor with its emphasis on systemwide mechanisms. Substantial returns to secondhand brokerage support a neoclassical perspective on social capital.
Within the Austrian metaphor, social capital is a local phenomenon in which a broker finds advantage in the flow of information familiar to the broker. The less performance-relevant the structure of indirect contacts, the more theory-relevant the Austrian metaphor with its emphasis on tacit knowledge about local norms and practice. Negligible returns to secondhand brokerage support an Austrian perspective on social capital. Relative to a mature capital market, for example, most markets (certainly resource markets within organizations) are less fluid, more sticky, more shaped by the politics of who supports an idea and who rises in opposition. Even in a relatively mature capital market, investors know they can benefit from insider information on the organizations coming together in a deal. This emphasis on the local is the heart of the Austrian market metaphor and can be found in diverse network studies. For example, Friedkin (1983) described a limited "horizon of observability" in networks. The probability that two directly connected professors know something about one another's current work drops to 28 percent as likely if their connection is only indirect through a mutual colleague, then to a near-zero 3 percent as likely if their connection is less direct. Killworth and Bernard (1978) found in their "reverse small world" experiments that people searched for an unfamiliar target person in a distant location by jumping to someone they knew in the target's region from whom a local search could begin. Drawing a more general comparison, Stuart and Podolny (1996) inferred local search from the tendency for organizations to file patents drawing on technology similar to the technology on which they drew for previous patents (despite the fact that such "crowding" is likely to produce a "dead end" patent [Podolny & Stuart, 1995] ). Sorenson and Stuart (2001) described the concentration of venture capital investments in companies that were within a few-mile radius around the investor, and OwenSmith and Powell (2004) described how successful patenting in biotechnology was predicted by brokerage within the local network more than by brokerage in the extralocal network. Against a backdrop of patent coauthor networks in Boston and Silicon Valley (two inventors were connected if they had coauthored a patent within a five-year window), Fleming, Colfer, Marin, and McPhie (2004) told a story about segregated groups in Silicon Valley becoming connected via people who had insider connections with one another from their time as post-docs at IBM's Almaden Valley Labs. As Sorenson and Stuart concluded, "Whenever personal and professional networks play a central role in economic activity, we will likely observe spatial patterns in the unfolding of that activity " (2001: 1584) .
I draw two hypotheses about secondhand brokerage from the discussion. The more closed a group network, the more likely that people in the group work with tacit knowledge in the form of mutually understood, unwritten language and routines to coordinate with one another. Distinct tacit knowledge familiar within groups is prone to being ignored or misunderstood between groups, which yields a premium to people who can coordinate it across the groups. The more tacit the information to be moved between groups, the more likely there will be misunderstandings in moving the information, so the more valuable it will be to anticipate and manage the misunderstandings by knowing the two groups through personal contacts in the groupswhich calls for direct brokerage. People who have close contacts in two groups will be better able to translate tacit knowledge between the groups. Imagine an economist and a psychologist trying to explain to economists the value of research on a psychological mechanism. Whatever the psychologist's advantage from knowing the mechanism, the economist has an advantage in knowing the economic vernacular, so she is more likely to find an attractive way to frame and communicate the mechanism to the target audience (e.g., consider the development of behavioral economics as an area). So it is in organizations more generally. A manager familiar with the tacit knowledge in a group has an advantage over outsiders in finding a way to frame and communicate a new idea to make it attractive to the group. Since there is always some element of tacit knowledge underlying the social capital of brokerage (else information would move easily between groups, so brokerage would offer no competitive advantage) and direct contact facilitates moving tacit knowledge, direct brokerage should be more rewarding on average than secondhand brokerage:
Hypothesis 1. Returns to brokerage are greater for direct contacts than indirect contacts.
How much greater is an empirical question. The extreme case would be the complete absence of returns to secondhand brokerage. Even if the extreme case is true in a population, however, it can be missed using current data collection methods. The line between direct and indirect contacts varies with research method. The fewer relations recorded as direct contacts, the more likely that some direct contacts will be coded as indirect contacts. Brokerage among such "indirect" contacts would in fact be brokerage among direct contacts erroneously coded as indirect contacts. Assuming that closer contacts are more likely to be recorded as direct contacts in any research design, however, average returns to brokerage among direct contacts should be higher than average returns to brokerage among indirect contacts. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated in terms of variable proximity: the more proximate the contacts, the higher the returns to brokering connection between the contacts.
The idea that brokerage among direct contacts is a variable amount more valuable than brokerage among indirect contacts segues to a second hypothesis. The more segregated the groups in an organization or market, the more likely their operations involve distinct tacit knowledge, so the more that brokerage involves moving tacit knowledge, the more valuable it is to have direct contact with people steeped in the tacit knowledge:
Hypothesis 2. Returns to brokerage are more concentrated in direct contacts where groups are more segregated from one another.
The extreme case would be the complete absence of returns to secondhand brokerage where groups are segregated, but here again, segregation is a variable condition, so the hypothesis is stated in terms of more versus less segregation.
Both hypotheses are assertions that the social capital of brokerage is more consistent with an Austrian than a neoclassical market metaphor. Tacit knowledge accumulates in groups and is difficult to move across groups, so I expect brokerage to be more valuable when it involves contacts unlikely to understand one another (Hypothesis 2) but well known to the broker (Hypothesis 1).
DATA AND METHOD
My research design was to test Hypothesis 1 by predicting performance from network measures of 124 February Academy of Management Journal direct and secondhand brokerage for a cross section of managers in a large organization, then test Hypothesis 2 by replicating the analysis in two lesssegregated study populations.
Network Constraint
I measured brokerage opportunities with a summary index, network constraint, that has been found to be associated with performance and varies with three network dimensions: size, density, and hierarchy. Network constraint measures the lack of brokerage opportunities. Constraint on a person is high if the person's contacts are strongly connected to one another directly (dense network) or through a central, mutual contact (hierarchical network). The constraint index begins with the extent to which manager i's network is directly or indirectly invested in the manager's relationship with contact j (Burt, 1992: Chap. 2 
, for q ij, where p ij is the proportion of i's network time and energy invested in contact j, p ij ϭ z ij /⌺ q z iq , and variable z ij measures the strength of connection between contacts i and j. Connection z ij measures the lack of a structural hole so it is made symmetric before p ij is computed in that a hole between i and j is unlikely to the extent that either i or j feels that they spend a lot of time in the relationship (strength of connection "between" i and j versus strength of connection "from" i to j [see Burt, 1992: 51] ). The total in parentheses is the proportion of i's relations that are directly or indirectly invested in connection with contact j. The sum of squared proportions, ⌺ j c ij , is the network constraint index C. I multiply scores by 100 to discuss integer levels of constraint.
The example in Figure 2 illustrates network constraint and my use of it to distinguish direct from secondhand brokerage. There are six groups in Figure 2 , each containing two roles: Persons 11 through 28 are "group members" in the sense that they are only connected to other people inside their own group (e.g., 11 is connected to 12, 13, and 5). The other role, "group leader," refers to people connected to someone outside their own group (persons 5 to 10). Persons 1 through 4 play a third role. They are positioned to be "brokers" in the sense that they connect people across groups. The first column of the table in Figure 2 reports network constraint scores for the three roles. Constraint is lowest for the brokers who link groups (33.3), higher for the group leaders who have at least the brokerage opportunity of linking their group to an outside person (58.3), and highest for the group members who only know people within their own group (86.8).
Indirect Network Constraint
My corresponding measure of limited opportunities for secondhand brokerage was the average net-
FIGURE 2 Illustration of Direct and Indirect Network Constraint
work constraint on a person's direct contacts. I tried more sophisticated aggregations, but the results were strongly correlated with the arithmetic average (see Appendix A for an account of measuring indirect constraint). A network surrounds each direct contact. The more connected the network around each contact, the more the contact is constrained in his or her brokerage opportunities. Constraint on a person's contacts is indirect constraint on the person. I discuss the average network constraint on a person's direct contacts as "indirect" network constraint to distinguish it from the "direct" constraint on the person in the immediate network of direct contacts. There are degrees to secondhand brokerage: Indirect contacts could be friends of friends, as in this paper, or more distant contacts, such as friends of friends of friends, and so on. For the purposes of this paper, I only use the broad distinction between direct and indirect contacts.
The second column of the table in Figure 2 shows indirect constraint scores for the illustrative network. Person 1 is connected to persons 2, 3, and 4, all of whom have constraint scores of 33.3, so the indirect constraint on person 1 is reported in Figure  2 as 33.3. Persons 2, 3, and 4 are each connected to person 1 and two people who are embedded in a group, so the indirect constraint on them is higher: 50.0 in Figure 2 . Group leaders are each connected to a broker and three group members, so indirect constraint on them is higher still (73.3). Finally, group members face the highest indirect network constraint (77.2) because their friends of friends are primarily other members of the group.
The third column of the table is included to illustrate how direct and indirect constraint are associated with Freeman's (1977) betweenness index. Betweenness measures access to structural holes anywhere in the network. Person 1, the broker of brokers, has the highest score. She brokers connections between 243 pairs of other people in the network, which is 69.2 percent of all 351 pairs possible. Persons 2, 3, and 4 broker fewer connections (168 of 351, or 47.9 percent betweenness). The group leaders broker connections with their team members (72 of 351 connections, or 20.5 percent betweenness). Team members are connected only to people already connected, so the team members broker no connections between direct or indirect contacts.
Returns to Brokerage
The broad prediction from previous research is that brokers (people in low-constraint networks such as persons 1 to 4 in Figure 2 ) have a social capital advantage over people in closed, high-constraint networks (e.g., team members 11 to 28 in Figure 2 ). The social capital advantage is visible as higher performance scores for the brokers.
This paper is about variation around the broad prediction from previous research. I argued in the previous section that there is always some element of tacit knowledge underlying returns to brokerage and that direct contact offers better comprehension of tacit knowledge, and I concluded in Hypothesis 1 that direct access to structural holes should be more valuable than indirect access. If the argument against secondhand brokerage is correct, performance scores should be highest for the three brokers in Figure 2 who have direct contacts in the groups-that is, persons 2, 3, and 4. Their personal connections in separate groups give them an advantage in translating opinion and behavior between the groups.
1
On the other hand, where information is more easily moved between groups (as in a mature capital market), the value of brokerage lies not in knowing specific groups in detail so much as in knowing how groups differ. Secondhand brokerage could be a competitive advantage because of the diversity of groups reached. In this situation, performance scores should be highest for brokers like person 1 in Figure 2 . Through her connections to persons 2 and 4, for example, she can select and synthesize among bits of knowledge in the four groups at the top of Figure 2 . Of the four brokers in the network, person 1 is exposed to the greatest diversity of opinion and behavior via her indirect connections to all six groups (person 1 has the highest betweenness score in the network).
Job rank is important to hold constant in these 1 The network in Figure 2 is similar to the laboratory network Cook and her colleagues used to study power in exchange networks (Cook & Emerson, 1978: 726; Cook, Emerson, & Gillmore, 1983: 280) . My hypothesis about returns to brokers 2, 3, 4 being higher than returns to broker 1 is similar to Cook's conclusion about who is most powerful in the network. There is an important difference at the periphery of the network. Figure 2 would replicate Cook's experimental network if the group members (persons 11 to 28) had no relations with one another, whereupon they would depend entirely on their team leader for information on the outside world. Instead, Figure 2 has complete connections within each group, whereupon group members can turn to one another within their separate social worlds for exchange and support. The image in Figure 2 of dense groups connected by bridges through brokers corresponds to the information arbitrage of brokerage in a small-world image of markets and organizations (Burt, 2005 considerations so that returns to bureaucratic authority do not get confounded with returns to brokerage. Other things constant, brokerage opportunities increase with job rank. For example, direct network constraint decreases for the managers described below from a mean of 74 points for junior managers down to 30 for the average executive (-11.38 Z-score test for ordinal association with five levels of job rank), and indirect network constraint decreases from 59 points for the average junior manager down to 37 for executives (-8.82 Z-score) . Senior people have separate work groups or divisions reporting to them, which gives them direct access to the structural holes between their subordinates and indirect access to the structural holes among the subordinates of their subordinates. In this light, the illustrative network in Figure 2 resembles a traditional corporate hierarchy with six teams reporting to three middle managers and the middle managers reporting to a senior executive.
I use regression models of the following form:
where P is a measure of individual performance, C is network constraint on the individual from direct contacts (first column of the table in Figure 2 ), and IC is the indirect network constraint on the individual from connections among indirect contacts (second column in the table in Figure 2 ). The final term, X, is a matrix containing a regression intercept and various control variables, including job rank, for a specific study population. My performance data come from institutional sources beyond the individuals whose performance is predicted: annual compensation and evaluations from company personnel records, and published records of individuals winning industry awards. My network data come from surveys, as explained for each study population. More constrained networks span fewer structural holes, which means fewer opportunities for brokerage, so returns to brokerage are indicated by the strength of negative association between performance and network constraint: Coefficient b 1 measures returns to direct brokerage, and b 2 measures returns to secondhand brokerage.
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGERS
I begin with supply chain leadership in a large American electronics company. Supply chain managers worked in legacy organizations that had been acquired by the parent company but retained substantial freedom to purchase supplies where they wished. In each product line, managers knew the products for which they ordered supplies and vendors from whom they had ordered supplies. There was little incentive to know the supply chain in other product lines. With people segregated by product and geography in separate groups, local supply chain operations were likely to involve quite a bit of tacit knowledge, and performance was likely to depend on coordinating people with whom managers had direct personal contact. Of the three populations to be analyzed, this was the one in which secondhand brokerage was least likely to enhance performance.
Network Structure
Survey network data were collected by the standard method of name generators and interpreters (e.g., Marsden, 1990 Marsden, , 2005 . The survey contained two name generators. Managers were asked to describe their best idea for improving supply chain operations and then asked if they had discussed the idea with anyone. If yes, they were asked to name the person. Next, they were asked, "More generally, who are the people with whom you most often discuss supply-chain issues?" The respondent was then guided through a matrix in which the respondent's perceived relation between each pair of contacts was coded as "often," "sometimes," or "rarely" in regards to how often the two contacts discussed supply chain issues. The 455 survey respondents were representative of all 673 managers in the population in the sense that there were no significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents in geographic region, business unit, job rank, age, race, gender, or education (Burt, 2004: 360 -365) . Perceived relations were used to fill in the network around nonresponding managers. There were two precedents for handling perceived relations elicited by survey name interpreters: assume equal intervals between response categories (e.g., Mizruchi & Sterns, 2001: 655-656; Podolny & Baron, 1997: 683) or derive quantitative scores from the response-category pattern of association with reported relations (e.g., Burt, 1992: 287-288; Burt & Guilarte, 1986) . Scaling the supply chain manager perceived relations showed that the managers made a deep distinction between relations perceived as "often" versus the less-strong relations perceived as "sometimes" or "rarely" in that contacts perceived to meet "often" were much more likely to cite one another as discussion partners (Burt, 2004: 361n) . I therefore connected two managers when they were perceived by a colleague to meet "often," or, of course, when one cited the other directly as a discussion partner. Figure 3 is a sociogram of the network across managers. The discussion network around individual managers varies from 1 to 25 contacts around a median of 7 contacts. For this analysis, I focus on discussion partners, and their partners, around each of the 455 managers who responded to the survey. Figure 3 shows the managers working in company divisions segregated by geography and products. The density table to the lower right in Figure  3 shows high percentages of discussion citations among managers in the same division and low percentages of citations to anyone outside the division. In the sociogram, managers in the largest division (triangles in the bottom half of the sociogram) and other managers are separated clearly. Within the largest division, there is a visible separation between (solid dark triangle) managers in a subdivision geographically segregated from the rest of the division (white triangles). In the top half of the sociogram, managers in the second-largest division (white circles) are separate from managers in the smaller divisions (solid dark circles). The location of squares in the sociogram shows some headquarters managers working in division offices, but most headquarters managers are at the center of the sociogram because of their connections to multiple 2 I have complete network data on direct contacts for the 455 respondent managers, and respondent reports on relations among their contacts provide network data on indirect contacts for each contact cited by a survey respondent. However, the network data on indirect contacts are probably incomplete. Suppose a manager cites Joe, who has four key contacts, two of whom were cited by the manager. I know Joe's relations with the two key contacts cited by the manager. I do not know Joe's relations with the two uncited key contacts. Fortunately, the survey respondents cited many connected contacts, so another manager could cite Joe and the two key contacts not cited by the first manager, thereby filling in Joe's relations with the other two key contacts. I only used perceived relations with the supply chain managers. There is ample precedent cited in the text for using perceived relations in analyses of survey network data, but I was primarily reassured in using perceived relations with the supply chain managers by the fact that the manager results were the same as the banker results in the next section, where I had complete network data on the direct and indirect contacts of the bankers. 
Results
Figure 4 displays two measures of manager performance, each showing returns to direct and second-hand brokerage. I am predicting performance evaluations and salary figures defined about six months after the network survey was conducted, but network and performance should be considered coterminous since salary is strongly correlated between adjacent years (.98 correlation between salary in the predicted year and salary the year before), and performance evaluations, though more subject to change than salary, are also strongly correlated between adjacent years (.82 correlation).
Relative compensation is dollars of salary measured as a Z-score on the vertical axis of Figure 4a . In round numbers, managers' salaries varied from $50,000 to $200,000. A score of zero on the Z-score salary variable in Figure 4a indicates a manager paid an average salary. Variables predicting salary are listed in Table 1 , with means, standard deviations, and correlations in Table 2 . Salary and the manager background variables in the tables were taken from company personnel records. "Job rank" was a five-category distinction between vice presidents, senior directors, directors, senior managers, and managers. "Age" was measured in years. The two education variables refer to college graduation or completing a postgraduate program. "Minority" is a dummy variable distinguishing women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics. "High-tech organization" and "Low-tech organization" are dummy variables respectively distinguishing divisions in which supply chain managers had to have 3 The count of relations expected under independence is computed here in the usual way (row marginal times column marginal divided by table total), so ratios of observed to expected are not exact. Exact counts require correction for relations cited by the same respondent (the 3,804 relations tabulated in Figure 3 come from 455 survey respondents). For the purposes here, the reported ratios of observed to expected relations are heuristics to put a familiar metric on the tendency for managers to talk primarily with colleagues in their own division. 129 Burt some technical expertise or no technical expertise. "Regional headquarters" distinguishes managers who worked in the headquarters of the largest division in the company. "Corporate headquarters" distinguishes managers who worked in corporate headquarters (squares in Figure 3 ). Returns to direct brokerage are shown in Figure 4a by the solid line describing a strong association between salaries and direct network constraint (-14.9 t-test for the regression line in the graph). Returns to secondhand brokerage are shown by the dashed line, which describes a strong salary association with indirect network constraint (-9 
.1 t-test).
Relative performance evaluation is the criterion in Figure 4b . Managers were assigned in their annual performance evaluation to one of three categories: "outstanding," "average," or "poor" (synonyms for the words actually used). For compari- Figure 4 . For the 455 supply chain managers, the first two models respectively predict annual salary and annual performance evaluation (.85 and .19 squared multiple correlations). The third column is an ordinal logit model predicting the three categories of annual evaluation, and the two intercepts are the cut points between the three categories (74.8 chi-square with 11 df, p Ͻ .001). Network constraint is the log of constraint. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
* p Ͻ .05 *** p Յ .001 son with the salary metric, I computed from integer values and the distribution of managers a Z-score for each level of evaluation (1.88 for "outstanding," 0.06 for "average," and -1.58 for "poor"). The solid line in Figure 4b shows that managers with diverse contacts were likely to receive an outstanding evaluation and managers with interconnected contacts were likely to receive a poor evaluation. Returns to direct brokerage are statistically significant (-6.7 t-test for the bold regression line in Figure 4b ). The dashed line shows detectable, but weaker, returns to secondhand brokerage (-2.5 t-test).
Regression equations in Table 1 show what happens when the network variables are combined with job rank and the other background variables to predict performance: Returns to direct brokerage are strong. No returns are attributed to secondhand brokerage. The ordinal logit regression in the third column shows the same results as the second column model predicting the Z-score evaluation metric in Figure 4b .
Job rank is the key control variable. Managers in more senior positions had more direct and secondhand brokerage in the sense that their direct personal contacts were people in separate groups who managed work across groups of lower-rank people (-.58 and -.41 correlations in Table 2 for job rank with direct network constraint and indirect network constraint). Holding only job rank constant eliminates the Figure 4 returns to secondhand brokerage for compensation (-9.1 t-test in Figure 4a drops to -1.2) and performance evaluation (-2.5 t-test in Figure 4b drops to 0.6).
INVESTMENT BANKERS
Segregation by product and geography made it likely that the supply chain managers relied on local tacit knowledge. They provided a relatively weak test of the secondhand brokerage hypothesis. The next study population provided a strong test in that it involved a global network integrated through a single center operating in a mature capital market. In this population, information could be expected to move quickly, over long distances, free of local interpretations. The second population was a group of senior people in a large American financial organization during the late 1990s (before the "dot.com" bubble bulged and burst). The people crafted investments and offered advice on investments. I will call them bankers.
4 Work in this population required flexible cooperation. It was impossible to monitor banker cooperation through bureaucratic chains of command because so much of their interpersonal behavior was unknown to their immediate supervisor. The firm was typical of the industry in using peer evaluations to monitor employee cooperation. Each year, bonus-eligible people identified colleagues with whom they worked during the preceding year and indicated how productive it was to work with the person ("poor," "adequate," "good," or "outstanding"; these are my synonyms for the words actually used). The ratings were considered in promotion and bonus decisions, so virtually all eligible employees responded.
Network Structure
From three years of peer evaluations, I identified contacts cited by each banker and contacts who cited the banker, then looked at each contact's evaluations to see how the contacts were connected with one another. The network around individual bankers contained a median of 20 senior contacts in and beyond the banking division. Figure 5 displays relations among 154 bankers in the third year. A line connects bankers when one cited the other as a colleague with whom he or she did frequent or substantial work during the year.
In contrast to the managers, the bankers lived in a center-periphery structure. They were connected through a single center indicated by the dense conjunction of lines in Figure 5 . If secondhand brokerage has value, it was more likely among the bankers than the managers because the bankers were less segregated into groups, reflecting the advantages of being close to the vortex of the "deal stream." Individual bankers shifted position in the network from one year to the next, but the same centerperiphery structure had characterized the network in the preceding two years. Annual sociograms of the bankers show the center-periphery structure was stable across years, though relations between individual bankers changed from year to year. The organization had two headquarters offices, one in the United States and one in Europe. In addition, there were senior people scattered across the globe in offices of one to a dozen individuals in select cities. Cells in the table to the lower right of the sociogram show the percent of citations made by the bankers in the row that went to the bankers in the column (tabulating only citations between bankers in Figure 5 ). For example, 24 percent of the citations from bankers in the European headquarters were to bankers in the U.S. headquarters. The primary feature of the network is the central role played by the U.S. headquarters, with some segregation between operations inside the United States and operations outside (recall that the data describe operations before September 2001). Bankers at the U.S. headquarters are at the center of the sociogram with dense ties to other bankers. The banker sociogram in Figure 5 is so densely connected it looks like a cloud of gnats more than the globally dispersed network it is.
Results
I used annual compensation as a performance metric for the bankers (see Eccles and Crane [1988: Chap. 8], on deliberations over banker compensation). Compensation was from the organization's personnel records. Total annual compensationwhich included salary, bonus, and the cash value of other compensation-varied from several hundred thousand dollars to several million. To obscure exact dollar amounts and remove year-to-year fluctuation, I standardized compensation for each year. A score of 0 on the Z-score compensation variable indicated a banker who received an average level of compensation for that year. A score of 1.0 indicated a banker with compensation one standard deviation higher than average, and so on. With people entering and leaving over the three years, there are a total of 467 banker observations (156 in the first year, 157 in the second year, and the 154 in Figure 5 in the third year). For each year, I knew the banker's compensation and background from company personnel records and had data on the banker's network constructed from citations with and beyond senior colleagues in the banking division.
The regression models in Table 3 show returns to both direct and secondhand brokerage with key background factors held constant (means, standard deviations, and correlations in Table 4 ). I do not repeat for the bankers the zero-order associations presented in Figure 3 for the managers. The regression results in Table 3 should now be sufficient to tell the story. Compensation next year is predicted from the row variables this year. Compensation is higher for bankers currently in the senior rank, who work in the U.S. headquarters, and especially those who receive more positive evaluations from other employees. "Peer evaluation" is the average evaluation reported for a banker in that year's annual peer evaluations. Some bankers in senior rank by the third year were not in senior rank two years earlier. "Senior job rank" is a dummy variable distinguishing bankers in the senior rank from those who will reach but have not yet reached the senior rank. "Years with firm" is the years that the banker has been with the firm. "Minority" is a dummy variable distinguishing women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics. "U.S. headquarters" is a dummy variable distinguishing bankers working that year in the U.S. headquarters office.
Model A shows returns to direct brokerage. There is a strong, negative association between compensation and direct network constraint (-4.51 t-test) . In other words, higher compensation went to bankers whose contacts in separate groups gave them opportunities to broker connections between groups. 5 5 I want the statistical power of reobserving people over time, but outcome correlation between adjacent years means that standard errors have to be increased for autocorrelation. Salary does not change much between years, but salary is a small portion of total compensation to the bankers (14% on average) so total compensation, in theory, could vary between years. However, gossip ensures stable reputations, which in turn ensure high correlation between compensation in adjacent years (see Burt [2005: Chap. 4 ] for detailed evidence of reputation stability increasing with network closure): Total compensation is correlated .93 between the first and second years, .94 between the second and third years. Even if I Model B shows returns to secondhand brokerage. There is a strong negative association between compensation and indirect network constraint (-3.70 t-test) . In other words, higher compensation went to bankers whose contacts' contacts were in a position to broker connections between groups. 6 However, bankers with many, disconnected contacts often had contacts who themselves had many, disconnected contacts, which means strong correlation between the measures of direct and indirect network constraint (.74 correlation). The results in model C show what happens when the two network measures are tested against one another. Returns to direct brokerage remain strong. Returns to secondhand brokerage are negligible. In other words, association between secondhand brokerage and compensation is due to disconnected direct contacts, through whom a banker reaches diverse indirect contacts.
ANALYSTS
Given the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage among the bankers, I moved to a kind of work even more likely to benefit from secondhand brokerage. The third study population was composed of senior people, in another division of the financial organization from which the bankers were drawn, who made recommendations about the market value of investments. I discuss them as analysts. They worked in a center-periphery structure broadly similar to the one in which the bankers worked, though more segregated by geography. Greater segregation can be expected to erode the value of secondhand brokerage, but analysts do a kind of work especially likely to benefit from secondhand brokerage. Information arbitrage is the substance of their work-speeding a bit of information found here to a customer over there-so analysts are especially likely to benefit from the access to diverse information that secondhand brokerage can provide.
Network Structure
My data on the analysts describe them during a transition in the definition of their work. Beginning in the 1970s, market pressure on commissions for buying and selling stocks led to analyst work becoming increasingly tied to investment banking. Especially through the 1990s, analysts became a prominent and powerful factor in investment business. The trend intensified a conflict of interest between analyst accuracy and analyst support of employer-sponsored investments. The conflict of interest drew public attention when the dot.com bubble burst in 2000 and it became apparent that analyst opinions expressed in e-mails with colleagues sometimes contradicted their opinions expressed in published reports.
The point significant for this analysis is that as analysts rose above their traditional backroom staff role to become contenders in the bonus pool, they were included in peer evaluations like bankers and other people with leadership responsibilities in financial organizations. Their inclusion in the peer evaluations provided the network data for this analysis. I had peer evaluations from and of senior analysts for the last two years of the three on which I had banker peer evaluations. The study population contained 197 analysts during the two years, 157 of whom were present in both years, for a total of 354 annual observations. As was done for the bankers, I identified for each year contacts cited by each analyst and contacts who cited the analyst, then looked at each contact's evaluations to see how the contacts were connected with one another. Analysts had a median annual network of 10 colleagues (versus 20 for the bankers). Figure 6 displays relations among the 182 analysts present in the second year. A line connects analysts when one cited the other as a colleague with whom he or she did frequent or substantial hold constant the predictors in Table 3 (job rank, tenure, minority, U.S. headquarters, and average peer evaluation), the partial correlations between compensation in adjacent years are .88 for the first and second years, .91 for the second and third years. Test statistics in Table 3 are adjusted down for autocorrelation in compensation across years (with the "cluster" option in STATA). 6 The peer evaluation data distinguish positive from negative relationships. I do not discuss the distinction in the text for two reasons: It cannot be replicated with the usual network data used to measure communication intensity or frequency. Second, positive and negative relations have the same association with performance, so they need not be distinguished in this paper. For each banker, each year, I computed two average levels of indirect network constraint: average constraint on the colleagues with whom the banker had a negative relationship (banker or colleague evaluated the relationship as adequate or poor), and average constraint on the colleagues with whom the banker had a positive relationship (banker or colleague evaluated the relationship as good or outstanding). If I reestimate model B in Table 3 with indirect constraint through positive relations, I get a -3.84 t-test for indirect constraint. I get a similarly strong -3.36 for indirect constraint through negative relations. Model C in Table 3 reestimated with indirect constraint through positive relations yields a -1.10 t-test for indirect constraint and a similarly negligible -1.16 for indirect constraint through negative relations. 134 February Academy of Management Journal work during the year. The distribution of analysts in Figure 6 resembles the distribution of bankers in Figure 5 , but the analysts are more segregated by geography. Cells in the table to the lower right of the sociogram show the percentages of citations made by analysts in the row that go to analysts in the column (tabulating only citations between analysts in the sociogram). For example, 2 percent of the citations from analysts in the European headquarters are to analysts in the U.S. headquarters. Analysts in the United States focus on analysts at the U.S. headquarters, largely disregarding analysts outside the United States. Analysts in the European headquarters focus on one another. Analysts elsewhere outside the United States focus on office colleagues and headquarters' analysts. Each analyst in the network is connected directly or through intermediaries to every other analyst. It is a connected network. Relative to the bankers, however, there is more obvious geographic segregation between the analysts.
Results
The substantial impact of analyst opinion on corporate finance has been an incentive to study and rate analysts for the quality of their opinions (see Hayward and Boeker [1998] , Zuckerman [1999] , Phillips and Zuckerman [2001] , and Fang and Yasuda [2005] , for complementary illustration and research review). With the growing celebrity of analysts in the 1990s, rating services multiplied. The All-America Research Team, begun in 1972, is one of the longest-running and often-noted ratings. The October issue of the trade magazine Institutional Investor names a first, second, third, and runner-up analyst in each of several industries. Election to the All-America Research Team involves votes from a few thousand institutional investors in several hundred financial organizations. Polling for the 1999 ratings was explained as follows: "To select the members of this year's All-America Research Team, Institutional Investor sent questionnaires covering 90 industry groups and investment specialties to the directors of research and chief investment officers of major money management institutions. Included were those managers on our rankings of the largest institutions in the U.S., as well as other key U.S., European and Asian institutions. . . . The opinions of more than 2,300 individuals-representing approximately 90 percent of the 100 largest U.S. equity managers, as well as 135 Burt more than 300 other key money management firms-were tapped" (Institutional Investor, 1999: 105-106) : Analysts are rated for their stock selection, earnings forecasts, written reports, and service. The highest-rated analyst in an industry is named to the first team, the next highest to the second team, and so on. Election to the All-America Research Team is a coveted award associated with professional status and financial reward (Eccles & Crane, 1988: 153-154; Hayward & Boeker, 1998) . In fact, the award is so much coveted that the election process is deliberately kept vague, as illustrated by the following excerpt from the 2005 Institutional Investor Web site: "To mitigate the likelihood of extraordinary, vote-generating activities on the part of firms or analysts during the fieldwork, it is the policy of Institutional Investor not to reveal the details relating to certain aspects of the survey execution process."
Let election recognition be the highest level of recognition that an analyst achieves in the Institutional Investor election: 0 for "not recognized," 1 for "runner-up," 2 for "third team," 3 for "second team," 4 for "first team." I gave analysts with nonzero scores in more than one industry the score for the highest recognition they achieved in any industry. I got the same associations with the network variables if I predicted an analyst's aggregate recognition across industries (because study population analysts recognized across industries tended to be extremely good in at least one industry; half of the study population analysts with nonzero scores in multiple industries were elected to the first team in at least one industry).
I also expressed election recognition as a Z-score (0 to 4 raw score minus the mean for the year across analysts, quantity divided by the standard deviation for the year). There was no reason to believe that election to the first versus second team was the same difference in recognition as election to the third team versus runner-up. I included predictions of Z-score recognition together with logit models predicting ordinal levels of recognition to show that both provided the same results, so I could use Z-score recognition in a summary graph across populations at the end of the paper. Table 5 contains the results of predicting election recognition this year from forecast activity during the year and company variables as of last year.
7 To preserve confidentiality, I report no intercepts for 7 I use network structure one year to predict election recognition next year, but I do not make too much of the time order because election recognition is so stable over time. For the two years in which I tracked the study population analysts, 84 percent of analysts elected in the first year were reelected in the second year, and there is a .91 correlation between Z-score recognition in the two years (the dependent variable in model E in Table 5 ). Test statistics in Table 5 are adjusted down for autocorrelation within analysts across years (with the "cluster" option in STATA). 351 observations) . Election this year is predicted from the two forecast variables for this year (bottom two rows) and the other row variables for last year. Network constraint is the log of constraint, and the average number of forecasts is the log average. Models A, B, C, D, and F are ordinal logit regressions predicting an analyst's highest rating for the year (4 for first team, 3 for second, 2 for third, 1 for runner-up, 0 for not being named; chi-square statistics of 45.76, 45.72, 39.80, 40.52, and 46.28 with 8, 8, 8, 9, and 10 df) . Model E is a least-squares regression predicting the numerical value of the five rating categories expressed as a Z-score for the year (.23 squared multiple correlation; zero-order correlations in Table 6 ). Standard errors, given in parentheses, are adjusted for autocorrelation within individuals across years.
* p Ͻ .05 *** p Յ .001 136 February Academy of Management Journal the logit models. Means, standard deviations, and correlations are given in Table 6 .
Model A in Table 5 shows returns to direct brokerage. There is a strong, negative association between election recognition and direct network constraint (-3.90 test statistic). Analysts connected across groups last year were more likely to be elected to the All-America Research Team this year.
Model B shows returns to secondhand brokerage. Election recognition has a negative association with indirect network constraint (-2.68 test statistic). Analysts who worked with colleagues who were connected across groups last year were more likely to be recognized in the election this year.
Models D and E show the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage. The two equations, respectively ordinal and interval predictions, show that election recognition of an analyst has a strong association with direct brokerage (test statistics of -3.30 and -4.05 for direct network constraint) and no association with secondhand brokerage (test statistics of -1.62 and -1.63 for indirect network constraint).
It is not the control for direct brokerage that eliminates the analyst evidence of returns to secondhand brokerage. Among the bankers, holding constant direct brokerage eliminated returns to secondhand brokerage (model C in Table 3 ). Bankers connected to brokers were themselves brokers. The banker explanation does not explain the analysts. Model C in Table 5 is for the analysts what model C was for the bankers in Table  3 . Model C shows returns to secondhand brokerage for the analysts even when their immediate network is held constant. Election recognition of an analyst decreases with direct network constraint from immediate contacts (-3.40 test statistic) and the indirect network constraint to which the analyst is exposed through those contacts (-2.28 test statistic).
What eliminates the analyst evidence of returns to secondhand brokerage is the control for analyst differences in the accuracy of their forecasts. There are two sets of control variables in Table 5 : six variables holding constant differences in analyst backgrounds and two variables controlling for analyst accuracy. The background variables are defined as they were in Table 3 for the bankers and are taken similarly from company personnel files. The one additional background variable is "office in the United States," which equals 1 for analysts working in the country at the time the network was measured and 0 for analysts outside the country. I added the U.S. control variable to test for effects from a U.S. focus in the election or the segregation between U.S. and non-U.S. analysts evident in the Figure 6 sociogram. When both network constraint variables are in the prediction, the U.S. control variable has no association with election outcomes, from which I infer that being in the United States is not as consequential for election recognition as brokering the flow of market information, which happens to be anchored in the United States for this study population. Of the six background variables in Table 5 , positive peer evaluations is the only one associated with election recognition across the models: positive reputation inside the company is a a Correlations are computed over analysts observed in two annual panels (351 observations). Network constraint is the log of constraint. The performance variable, election to the All-America Research Team, is for each year an analyst's highest rating from Institutional Investor (4 for election to first team, 3 for second team, 2 for third team, 1 for runner-up, 0 for not being named). To preserve confidentiality and relative performance during each year, the performance variable is here measured as a Z-score for each year (criterion variable for model E in Table 5 ).
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137 Burt robust correlate of positive reputation in the broader market outside the company. 8 I followed Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) in measuring analyst accuracy relative to competitors. "Forecast accuracy" in Table 5 was the extent to which an analyst's earnings forecasts were more accurate than forecasts by other analysts covering the same companies (see Appendix B for an account of how analyst accuracy was measured). Accuracy is an oft-discussed aspect of analyst work, and there is evidence of more accurate analysts being more likely to get elected to the All-America Research Team (see Stickel [1992] , for 1981-85 and see Fang and Yasuda [2005 ], for 1983 . Model D in Table 5 is model C with a control for differences in analyst accuracy. Model D shows that analysts who make more accurate forecasts are more recognized in the All-America election (2.62 test statistic), and holding accuracy constant eliminates the evidence of returns to secondhand brokerage (-2.28 test statistic for indirect network constraint in model C is -1.62 in model D).
I have to go one step deeper to explain the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage among the analysts. Accuracy is not the key variable. Many people with an "analyst" job title in the study population could not be found for the relevant years in the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Specifically, 74 of the 197 analysts could not be matched to forecasts. All 197 analysts were senior people in a large financial organization, so they were not peripheral people. In fact, 3 of the 74 unlisted analysts were elected to the All-America Research Team during the two years under study. One explanation for the unlisted analysts is that analysts can choose not to have their name listed with their forecasts in the I/B/E/S data. Another explanation is that the analyst job category includes people, a great many people judging from this study population, who do not make earnings forecasts about individual companies. For example, the three unlisted analysts elected to the AllAmerica Research Team each managed a team of analysts.
Whatever the reason for the unlisted analysts, they create a problem for holding accuracy constant when comparing people within the analyst job category. The problem does not arise when a study population is defined by available archival data, because analysts for whom there are no forecast records do not appear in the data (e.g., Fang & Yasuda, 2005; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Stickel, 1992) .
For models A, B, D, and E in Table 5 , I resolved the problem in an ad hoc way by giving the unlisted analysts a Z-score accuracy of zero-i.e., average-in as much as I had "found no forecasts more or less accurate than forecasts from other analysts."
I tried alternative solutions to the problem, all of which led to the same conclusion, so I present the simplest of the alternatives as model F in Table 5 . Model F is an ordinal logit model identical to model D except that model F contains in the bottom row a dummy variable, "in the I/B/E/S data," that distinguishes analysts for whom I found forecasts in the two years of I/B/E/S data.
Three things happened when I added the control for unlisted analysts. First, the negligible association between election recognition and secondhand brokerage dropped to near zero (0.24 test statistic for indirect network constraint in model F versus -1.62 in model D).
Second, unlisted analysts were unlikely to be elected. Publishing forecasts so as to appear in the I/B/E/S data was strongly associated with election recognition (and the same strong association occurred in predicting Z-score election recognition: 4.62 test statistic). I computed a more sophisticated measure that increased with the visibility of the companies an analyst covered, but covering more visible companies added nothing to the prediction by the simple dummy variable "in the I/B/E/S data" (see the last paragraph in Appendix B).
Third, analyst accuracy was no longer associated with election recognition. I also obtained this result if I predicted Z-score election recognition or estimated models D and E using only observations on the analysts for whom I found forecasts in the I/B/E/S data (reducing the 351 observations in Table 5 to 211 observations). For these analysts, publishing accurate forecasts was less important for election recognition than the publishing itself. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001: 410 -411 ) reported a similarly near-zero correlation over all analysts between forecast accuracy and election recognition.
In sum, an analyst's chances of being elected to the All-America Research Team increased with 8 I suspect that job rank would be associated with election recognition if the population were expanded to lower ranks. However, estimating job rank effects on election recognition is not the goal here. To better distinguish components in the election association with network structure, I focus on senior people, the people most at risk of recognition across institutional investors, and so most at risk of election to the All-America Research Team. "Senior job rank" in Table 5 distinguishes analysts in senior rank for both years from those promoted into senior rank during the first year. I included it in the table to control for the minimal job rank differences between the analysts. 138 February Academy of Management Journal publishing forecasts (so as to appear in the I/B/E/S data) and having good contacts in diverse groups (direct brokerage and positive peer evaluations). Chances were not improved directly by working with people who had good contacts in diverse groups (secondhand brokerage). Having one's own direct, personal contacts in diverse groups mattered for the analysts, as it did for the managers and bankers.
ACROSS THE THREE POPULATIONS
The managers are a productive contrast to the bankers and analysts because the groups worked in structures with such different implications for brokerage. The bankers and analysts worked in a global center-periphery structure anchored in the U.S. headquarters. A large, sparse colleague network surrounded the average banker. The median number of contacts was 20, with 14 points of network constraint. Analyst contacts were fewer in number but drawn from more diverse groups, so average network constraint was about the same as it was on bankers (10 contacts for the median analyst with 13 points of network constraint). Given a mature capital market and strong connections across groups, information should move easily across groups, which would make more valuable the broad diversity of information provided by secondhand brokerage. The most efficient way to stay in touch with developments across the network would to be to work with colleagues who were broadly connected across the network. It would not be surprising to find returns to secondhand brokerage among the bankers and analysts.
In contrast, the segregation of supply chain managers by geography and products made it likely that returns to brokerage were concentrated in direct rather than secondhand brokerage. The average manager was surrounded by a small, dense discussion network. The median number of contacts was 7, with 60 points of network constraint. Belief and practice are likely to differ between people segregated in separate groups, so coordination across groups is likely to involve moving tacit knowledge between groups, which is facilitated by direct, personal contact to people in the groups. It would not be surprising to see meager returns to secondhand brokerage among the managers.
It is thus all the more striking to see the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage alongside substantial returns to direct brokerage in all three study populations. Consider the summary comparisons in Table 7 . Rows distinguish combinations of high and low levels of direct and indirect network constraint (high is above median for a study population, noted in Figure 4 for the managers), and performance is a Z-score residual holding constant all but the two network variables in Tables 1, 3 , and 5. Performance is clearest in the extreme networks. Performance is highest for managers, bankers, and analysts rich in direct and secondhand brokerage (top row in Table 7 ). Performance is lowest in closed networks (the "no brokerage" rows at the bottom of Table 7 ).
The key results are in the middle of Table 7 , for compound networks in which direct and secondhand brokerage contradict one another. Direct brokerage alone is associated with performance, and secondhand brokerage is not (the "direct only" versus "secondhand only" rows in Table 7 ). Emphasize the qualifier "alone." It is not the case that people connected to brokers do poorly. Quite the contrary; they do well. The zero-order association between performance and secondhand brokerage is strong in all three study populations. However, people who do well and are affiliated with brokers are people who are themselves brokers. The most telling evidence against secondhand brokerage comes from the negligible returns to networks that provide little direct access to structural holes but high indirect access (the "secondhand only" rows): people who are not brokers themselves get no performance benefit from affiliation with a broker.
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Direct brokerage involves a person moving information from one group to another, relying on his or her own contacts in the groups. Previous research has documented various returns to direct brokerage, including good ideas, more positive job evaluations, higher compensation, and faster promotion. Secondhand brokerage refers to moving information between groups to which the broker is only indirectly connected through other brokers. Judging from the results shown in Tables 1, 3 , and 5, performance in all three populations is more associated with direct than indirect brokerage-as predicted in Hypothesis 1. More striking is the complete irrelevance of indirect contacts, which goes beyond the hypothesis to say that social capital in circumstances as diverse as these managers', bankers', and analysts' is concentrated in a person's network of direct contacts. There is no evidence of the contingency predicted by Hypothesis 2. To be sure, there is evidence of returns to secondhand brokerage among the analysts when the key variables of direct constraint and job rank are held constant (model C in Table 5 ), and the analysts can be argued to be more likely than the managers or bankers to benefit from information arbitrage through indirect contacts. However, the evidence of analyst returns to secondhand brokerage disappears when forecast accuracy is held constant (models D, E, and F in Table 5 ).
Implications for Research Design
The results are consequential for the two reasons discussed at the beginning of the paper. With respect to research design, the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage supports the validity of designs in which brokerage is measured with network data limited to each respondent's direct contacts. This does not mean that designs including the broader network of indirect contacts are incorrect. The point is only that network data on direct contacts are sufficient to measure brokerage, which is an extremely attractive conclusion for scholars wishing to include network variables in area probability surveys.
Ignoring structure beyond the immediate network simplifies research design in other ways. For example, one need not worry about how to aggregate links in indirect connections. How strong is a two-step friend-of-a-friend connection relative to a direct connection, or relative to a three-step friendof-a-friend-of-a-friend connection? There is no definitive answer. Katz (1953) proposed fractional links whereby indirect connections decrease as a function of the number of steps involved (e.g., .5 for two steps, .25 for three steps, .125 for three steps, etc.). In earlier work (Burt, 1976) , I proposed a frequency measure in which strength decreases as a function of the volume of contacts at each step (the more people reached, the less strong the connection with each person). Freeman (1977) gave equal weight to connections of any length in his popular betweenness index (the probability that a message passes along any particular geodesic is equal to one over the number of alternatives). Simultaneous relations are assumed in all these measures. Moody (2002) discussed the further complication of indirect connections in discontinuous relations ordered in time. If a connection between persons A and B happens today, and a connection between persons B and C happens tomorrow, then A's news can travel to C through the A-B-C indirect connec-tion, but C's news will not travel to A through the C-B-A connection because the A-B discussion is finished by the time C's news reaches B. Sequence is an obvious issue in the sexual relations that Moody (2002) described. In a discussion network, on the other hand, B can remember C's news and relay it in B's next conversation with A. Coordination is still an issue: How much time will elapse before B has another conversation with A? Will B remember to transmit C's news in subsequent conversations? If these complexities are kept in mind, analysis is greatly simplified by the knowledge that returns to brokerage are concentrated in direct contacts. Weighting links in indirect connections to friends of contacts is not an issue for brokerage measures because measurement can stop with the network of direct contacts. The timing of component links in indirect connections beyond direct contacts is similarly unproblematic-though time remains an interesting puzzle: Observed returns to brokerage might depend on the tension of contradictory simultaneous relations with direct contacts (see Merton [1957] on role strain alleviated by segregating in time relations that conflict with one another), and sequence disorder beyond direct contacts could be responsible for the observed lack of returns to secondhand brokerage.
Implications for Social Capital Theory
With respect to theory, I contrasted the neoclassical market metaphor implicit in network measures of information moving through long, indirect connections with the Austrian metaphor emphasizing tacit knowledge about local norms and practice. The lack of returns to secondhand brokerage in the three study populations highlights the relevance of the Austrian market metaphor to social capital theories of brokerage.
More interesting than a choice between the two market metaphors is the possibility of characterizing an organization by the degree to which it corresponds in operation to either metaphor. Consider the graph in Figure 7 . The horizontal axis is the number of network steps between broker and contact. Direct contacts are one step, friends of friends are two steps, and so on. The vertical axis is the magnitude of the test statistic reported here for association between performance and brokerage among contacts at each remove. From an initial level of three and a half times the standard error for returns to direct brokerage, returns drop below statistical significance for secondhand brokerage-for the managers, the bankers, and the analysts.
The lines in the graph are the reason for presenting Figure 7 . The lines are extrapolated from returns to direct and secondhand brokerage using the following power function to capture decreasing returns from brokering connections between more distant contacts: t ϭ a(PD␥), in which t is the test statistic on the vertical axis of Figure 7 , PD is the path distance from broker to contact on the horizontal axis, "a" is an intercept, and gamma (␥) describes the extent to which returns to brokerage are concentrated in direct contacts. For example, t-tests for the bankers in model C, Table 3 , are -3.43 for direct constraint and -1.50 for indirect constraint, which implies a value of -1.19 for gamma describing the bold line in Figure 7 . Some other functional form could be more appropriate. I use a power function here because it is simple and often describes network effects.
The gamma coefficients in Figure 7 describe the extent to which structural holes in an organization are difficult to bridge, so the organization corresponds in operation to the Austrian market metaphor, with its emphasis on tacit knowledge about local norms and practice. A gamma coefficient of zero indicates an organization in which information moves easily across groups in such a way that the organization can be described by a neoclassical market metaphor and brokerage opportunities should be measured by indirect connections across the organization. The more negative the gamma coefficient, the more that brokerage value is concentrated in the immediate network around individuals. The minimum gamma in Figure 7 is -2.00 for manager job evaluations, which means that their job evaluations are the criterion performance variable in this paper that is most improved with local, tacit knowledge.
Let the lines described by a gamma coefficient in Figure 7 be "gamma lines." A question for future research is how gamma lines vary across organizations. The three study populations analyzed here are quite different, but the gamma lines for them in Figure 7 are quite similar. Is it usual for gamma lines to be so similar for such different organizations? How rare are flat gamma lines? If flat gamma lines do not occur, network models of brokerage need not take into account long, indirect connections since such connections do not affect direct brokerage. Are there organizations in which returns to brokerage are even more concentrated in direct contacts, which would mean steeper gamma lines than the ones in Figure 7 ? The steeper the gamma lines, the more exclusively brokerage is about local connections and tacit knowledge.
There are implications for policy informed by social capital theory: the flatter the gamma line for an organization, the more efficient it is to centralize services. Consider a leadership team launching a process initiative such as Six Sigma. The organization operates multiple business units in multiple cities. Some companies develop Six Sigma experts within the businesses. Other companies develop experts at a central location and send them as needed to the businesses. The virtue of developing experts within the businesses is that the experts know the local businesses, so they can more readily explain how Six Sigma can help in them. The virtue of developing experts in a central location is a uniform level of expertise at lower cost. Choosing between the two alternatives can be a political struggle. Gamma lines have diagnostic value. The steeper the gamma line for the business units affected by a new initiative, the more that brokerage depends on direct connections, so change agents should be located in the businesses. The flatter the gamma line, the more that brokerage is productive across long, indirect connections, so the more efficient it would be to centralize change agents in one location.
Turning from whole organizations to the individuals within them, the concentration of brokerage value in direct connections raises questions about micro mechanisms that could be success factors in brokerage. Motivation is an example. Why would anyone want to be connected to a broker? The answer is clear in the neoclassical market model: Being close to brokers is an efficient way to get early access to diverse information traveling over long, indirect connections. The answer is not clear when returns are concentrated in direct contacts. Brass (2006) described a variety of ways that brokers profit more from contacts than contacts profit from brokers. He also described unique benefits of being connected to a broker. The balance between benefits and costs remains a question. The results summarized in Table 7 show no returns to being connected to a broker without being a broker oneself.
However, there is a learning function not explored here. Secondhand brokerage this year could be valuable as a way to learn to broker next year. Rauch and Watson (2006) explored a gametheoretic model in which the probability of someone becoming an entrepreneur is increased by having a colleague who became an entrepreneur. The Table 7 would seem to reject the Rauch and Watson model since there are no returns to the secondhand brokerage of being connected to a broker. In fact, the benefit is indirect, as assumed in Rauch and Watson's model. Using the network constraint data in this paper, Table 8 shows two regression models predicting the network structure of direct contacts next year from the structure of direct and indirect contacts this year, one for bankers and the other for analysts. The analyst model in Table 8 shows that direct brokerage next year increases with direct and secondhand brokerage this year. Being connected to a broker this year increases direct access to structural holes next year. The same is not true for the bankers. I have three annual observations on the bankers so each banker is observed through two transitions: year 1 to 2, and year 2 to 3. Direct brokerage next year has no association with secondhand brokerage this year.
These results are consistent with the idea that secondhand brokerage provides future competitive advantage in which people learn to broker through direct contact with existing brokers. Secondhand brokerage offered some advantage to the analysts, and they are the people for whom secondhand brokerage last year enhanced direct brokerage this year.
Other familiar micro mechanisms come quickly to mind for future research. With respect to cognitive ability, for example, returns to secondhand brokerage might be available to anyone who can think strategically about indirect contacts, but returns end up concentrated in direct contacts because most people cannot, or do not have the energy to, think through the complexity of brokerage in the broader network. The research question for this possibility would ask how returns to secondhand brokerage vary with broker intelligence. With respect to face-to-face mechanisms, the value of brokerage could be concentrated in direct contacts because successful brokerage requires emotional connection as lubricant, which works best with direct contact-the proverbial value of beginning with a face-to-face meeting. The research question for this possibility would ask about the emotions that attend brokerage and whether returns to brokerage are eroded or enhanced by emotional correlates. From emotion, it is a short step to trust. Perhaps the trust required for brokerage is concentrated between friends, fading quickly between friends of friends. Research questions for this possibility would ask how returns to brokerage vary with the history between broker and contact, or how returns vary with enforceable reputation cost for poor behavior between broker and contact. There is argument and initial evidence for all of these possibilities. The summary conclusion from this paper is that returns to brokerage are concentrated in direct connections. That concentration in the immediate network around a person gives micro mechanisms of cognition and emotion new significance as success factors in brokerage. column is the correlation between direct and indirect network constraint. The first row is the measure used in the text: Indirect constraint is the average network constraint on ego's direct contacts (alters one step distant from ego). The bottom row corresponds to the longest path distance, which in this population is five steps. As the network around ego expands (down the rows) to include more distant alters, the indirect constraint standard deviation decreases and the correlation between direct and indirect constraint approaches negative one. I am comfortable in this paper with alter averaging because indirect constraint is limited to direct contacts and direct contacts are few relative to the number of people in each study population. In other populations, convergence could be an issue to consider. Ceteris paribus, the convergence to negative one will be faster in smaller, more connected populations.
Third, the average-alter measure of indirect constraint used in this paper should not be confused with counts of indirect contacts. For example, the lack of returns to secondhand brokerage here does not contradict Ahuja's (2000) widely cited demonstration that innovation is associated with direct and indirect contacts. Ahuja used the collaboration network among 107 chemicals firms to predict the number of successful patents filed by each firm annually over a ten-year period. Two firms were connected when they had a collaborative tie such as a joint venture, technology-sharing agreement, or the like. Ahuja (2000: 437-439 ) characterized each firm's position in the network by three measures: a count of direct contacts (firms with which the focal firm had a collaborative tie), a count of indirect contacts (collaborators with the focal firm's direct contacts; weighted counts of indirect ties were correlated .92 with the simple count), and efficiency (the proportion of a firm's contacts that were nonredundant). Table A2 contains correlations among the criterion patent count, the three network predictors, an interaction between direct and indirect contacts, and firm size measured as the log number of employees (Ahuja, 2000: 444) . The correlation pattern shows that filing patents was associated with large firms in numerous collaborations (many direct contacts), direct contacts were the dominant component in the interaction term (.99 correlation), and the count of indirect contacts was strongly correlated with efficiency (.86 correlation; firms with disconnected direct contacts have numerous indirect contacts).
Conclusions from the Table A2 correlation pattern are twice unaffected by the results reported here on the managers, bankers, and analysts. First, counts of direct and indirect contacts are distinct from network constraint. Counts of direct and indirect contacts measure centrality: Table A2 shows that firms central in the industry collaboration network were more involved in patents. Network constraint is about direct and indirect access to disconnected contacts. On that note, Ahuja used network efficiency as a measure of access to structural holes among direct contacts. However, my second point here is that efficiency, which is akin to network density, is one of the three components in network constraint (size, density, and hierarchy). Efficiency is the ratio of nonredundant contacts to total contacts. Efficiency equals 1.0 for a firm with 3 disconnected contacts. It equals 1.0 for a firm with 30 disconnected contacts. Surely, the second firm has more access to structural holes. Network constraint increases with density and decreases with network size to capture access to structural holes (constraint on the 3-contact firm would be 32.7 points, as discussed in the text, and constraint on the 30-contact firm would be a much lower 3.3 points).
APPENDIX B Measuring Analyst Accuracy
I followed Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) in measuring the relative accuracy of analysts as the extent to which an analyst's earnings forecasts were more accurate than forecasts by other analysts covering the same company. I used data from the I/B/E/S Detailed History File for each of the two years concluded with an Institutional Investor election, dating each forecast by the point at which its accuracy would be known (e.g., a forecast published in December 1997 about annual earnings as of June 1998 would be assigned to 1998). Analyst forecasts of company earnings per share (EPS) are listed in the I/B/E/S data with actual earnings so the magnitude by which an analyst forecast was wrong for company f can be measured as (cf. Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 410) : ABSDIF ift ϭ ͉actual EPS ft -forecast EPS ift ͉, which is the absolute difference between the actual annual EPS for firm f in year t and analyst i's forecast of the company's annual EPS. To hold constant differences between the companies covered by different analysts, I obtained the following Z-score measuring accuracy relative to other forecasts on the same company: Z ift ϭ (MABSDIF ft -ABSDIF ift )/SDABSDIF ft , where MABSDIF ft is the average ABSDIF jft for analysts j forecasting firm f's EPS in year t, and SDABSDIF ft is the standard deviation of their forecasts. To measure analyst i's accuracy during year t, I averaged the Z ift across firms f during year t for analyst i's annual earnings forecasts made within six months of a company announcing its actual earnings. An accuracy Z-score of zero indicates an analyst for whom I found no forecasts more or less accurate than forecasts from other analysts covering the same companies. Positive Z-scores indicate an analyst for whom I found forecasts closer to actual earnings than the forecasts from other analysts covering the same companies.
I have three notes on the accuracy measure. The first concerns the time interval in which accuracy is measured. Table B1 shows the rate at which forecasts became more accurate closer to a company announcing its actual earnings. The I/B/E/S data list an average of 141,773 annual earnings forecasts per year from 1996 through 1999. For each forecast made by any analyst in the two years of the I/B/E/S data under study here, I computed the Z ift accuracy measure described in the text for analyst i forecasting the annual earnings of firm f during year t. I divided the number of days between forecast date and the date of announced earnings by 30 to assign forecasts to a month, distinguished by the rows in Table B1 . Forecasts made less than 30 days before announced earnings are in the "same month" row at the top of the table. Forecasts made more than 360 days before announced earnings are in the "eleven or more" row at the bottom of the table. Variation in forecasts (last column) is consistent across the rows, but the center of the distribution, the average analyst forecast, becomes more accurate closer to announced earnings (middle column). Accuracy is highest for forecasts made during the month in which earnings were announced (0.65 mean Z-score). Accuracy decreases with length of time in longer-range forecasts to a minimum in forecasts made a year before earnings were announced (-0.53 mean Z-score). The pattern is the same for both of the two years under study here; it is the same for U.S. companies versus companies elsewhere; and there is no tendency for forecasts on U.S. firms to occur earlier or later than forecasts on companies elsewhere. Note the shift from below-average to above-average accuracy during the sixth month before announced earnings-which encourages following Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) in measuring analyst accuracy with forecasts made six months before announced earnings and is the reason for the nonzero mean accuracy in Table 6 (accuracy in the text is based on forecasts six months before announced earnings, and the above table shows that forecasts in that interval are above-average accurate). Some analysts tended to make forecasts closer to announced earnings, so they were on average more accurate in their forecasts, which could affect the accuracy association with election recognition. I computed the average time interval between forecast and announced earnings for each analyst, each year (the mean is 3.77 months before announced earnings with a standard deviation of 3.29 months) and reestimated models D and F in Table 5 with the average time interval held constant. Election associations with network constraint in models D and F are not affected: Test statistics for election recognition eroded by direct network constraint are -2.97 and -2.89 in models D and F respectively, and indirect network constraint continues to have no association with election recognition (-0.14 and -0.90 test statistics).
A second note concerns averaging forecasts to characterize an analyst's accuracy. The measure in the text gives equal weight to each company on which an analyst makes forecasts. To consider a more sophisticated alternative, I computed accuracy as an average weighted by company prominence-on the intuition that investors are more likely to notice analyst accuracy in forecasts about more prominent companies. Instead of the simple average in the text (⌺ M Z ift [1/M] , where M is the number of forecasts being averaged), I computed a weighted average (⌺ M Z ift [RF/RI] , where RF is the number of forecasts made by all analysts on firm f during year t, and RI is the total number of forecasts made by all analysts on the firms in the M forecasts). For example, imagine an analyst who made two forecasts, one about company A and one about company B, where there were 44 forecasts from other analysts about company A and 4 forecasts from other analysts about company B. The accuracy measure in the text would give equal weight to the analyst's two forecasts (M ϭ 2). The weighted average would give nine times more weight to the analyst's forecast about company A (RF ϭ 45 for company A, RF ϭ 5 for company B, RI ϭ 50 for the analyst). I suspect that analysts make more forecasts about prominent companies, whereupon an unweighted average is self-weighting for company prominence, because the weighted and unweighted measures are correlated .96 for the analysts in this paper, and I obtain the same predictions in Table 5 with either A third note concerns analysts unlisted in the I/B/E/S data. I tried a measure more sophisticated than the simple dummy variable used in the text. The more sophisticated measure treated unlisted analysts as the low end of a continuum that increases with the visibility of the companies on which an analyst made forecasts. Let N ft be the number of forecasts in the I/B/E/S data predicting the annual earnings of firm f during year t. Let N(i) be the average of N ft for firms f on which there was a record in the I/B/E/S data of a forecast from analyst i during year t. N(i) equals zero for unlisted analysts. It increases above zero as analyst i covers companies on which many analysts publish many forecasts. The more forecasts made about the companies an analyst covers, the more visible the analyst's companies in the sense of warranting the attention that went into the many forecasts. I added N(i) to model F in place of the dummy variable at the bottom of Table 5 and obtained exactly the same results reported in Table 5 : analysts who covered more visible companies were more likely to be elected to the All-America Research Team, and there were no election associations with accuracy or indirect network constraint. However, if I reestimate the models for only the analysts located in the I/B/E/S data, or if I return the dummy variable distinguishing unlisted analysts, there is no election association with analyst differences in the visibility of the companies they covered. Test statistics for model F in Table 5 are 0.95 for N(i) and 2.73 for the dummy variable at the bottom of the table distinguishing unlisted analysts, versus 2.69 for N(i) when the dummy variable is not included in the model. In short, the aspect of the more sophisticated measure that is associated with election recognition is the aspect captured by the dummy variable in the text distinguishing analysts who could not be matched to forecasts in the I/B/E/S data.
